年薪20万美元,为什么还依旧过不好生活Making $200K a Year and Still Living Paycheck to Paycheck
Translated from the Chinese original, first published on WeChat「世像」on June 16, 2025.本文 2025.06.16 首发于微信公众号「世像」。
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最近正逢全球毕业季,前段时间和一个在硅谷大厂工作的朋友聊起AI,大厂和工作的情况。2025年,中美两边的就业市场,都不是很好,甚至可以说非常差。
在结构性失业依旧没有改观之外,摩擦性失业,周期性失业,技术性失业因为AI和宏观因素而产生显著增长。
以下是我自己一年的体验感受结合之前的反馈体会,仅为个人言论,不针对任何公司和个人,欢迎讨论探讨。
以下, enjoy
01 世界的本质是一个巨大的竞价排名
如果画一张坐标图,找一个分界线,18年或者20年会是一个明显的提名。对于中美职场,应该都是一个显著的分界线。疫情改变了很多,甚至改变了一切。
18年适逢Trump任期第一轮贸易战,25年则为第2任任期贸易战开端。
18年之前,来美读书的中国人,回国vs 留美比例大概73开/82开;而现如今,完全反了过来:留美vs回国73开,或者82开。
以身边样本为例,14年普林斯顿计算机专业Phd毕业,毕业后在硅谷工作5年,老婆也在互联网公司,黑话俗称:"硅谷双码"。
1.住:14年在硅谷湾区买房,120万$的house(现在房价应该翻了近1倍),2000sqft≈185平方米,4卧,3卫,带学区房,货款60万$,每月还贷3500$,房产税1.12%,每月1100$。治安好。路不拾遗,夜不闭户。
2.吃: 夫妻两早上中午都在公司吃,晚上在家自己做,虽然公司晚上也有晚饭,但一生要强的中国胃,还是自己做吃得舒服。周末外面吃2-3顿,一个月2000$.
3.玩:1年世界各地旅游两次,回国1年1次。1年1万$。
4.行:车两部,保险维护加油,一年5000$.
5.工作:早11晚7,有大量时间自己支配。和同事相处不错,跳槽一次,大厂staff engineer,下一步准备走管理路线。
6.收入:个人50+万刀,老婆30万$,放足401k后,算上401k,税后收入大概50万$,支出11万$,目前每年存39万$左右。
对比他国内同学,同样学霸一枚,关系很好的铁哥们。2010年就去了腾讯,那会移动互联网还没兴起。目前是某方向的小老板,职级:T3,工资130多万,税后80万左右。家庭收入税后90万。996为常态,工作压力很大。目前名下的资产(股票现金)是他的2-3倍。
这朋友2019去了一家创业公司。2021年上半年上市,股票涨了8倍。
以上大概是2020年前的美国职场和物价。
2020年后呢?教育(学费),医疗,住房,变成了新时代的三座大山。
加州最普罗大众的超市safeway,哈根达斯7$一个;全麦面包4$一个;一捧鲜玫瑰花(12朵)14.99$,平均1朵1$;苹果3$ 一磅;卷心菜3.69$一个,牛奶3.8$ (2.5升);玉米0.7$一根;香蕉1$一磅;traderjoe是0.23/0.29$一根,洗衣液 18$ 大概2.5升.
鸡蛋,矿泉水,牛奶这些生活必须品的价格5年翻了1倍,去餐厅吃饭的小费,18%起,甚至去一些自助点餐的机器上,也会蹦出来让你支付小费。
硅谷有个年纪相仿的朋友,毕业进了大厂,非常体面,入职大概20-25万$,平时也不乱花钱,但每个月月底算一下帐,日子还是紧巴巴,甚至有时每个月还得通过卖股票,才能付清账单。
(图:原文此处有配图——Price Changes of Consumer Goods and Services,2000年以来美国各类商品服务价格变化)
这里头的原因是:这个世界本质是一个巨大的竞价排名。
你的收入以及相应的生活水平本质上取决于两个事情:第一,你的收入在本地的排名,比如在北京/上海当地,在湾区/纽约当地;第二个,你的收入全国,乃至全球范围内的排名。
你的全球排名,本质上代表了你对商品的最大购买力。如果某种商品能通过装在集装箱里,然后通过不同的交通方式运到其他国家/大洋彼岸,它本质上是全球一起进行竞价购买。比如中国可以买到智利生产的车厘子,美国可以买到中国生产的iPhone,虽然有物流/关税,但商品的最终的价格在不同国家最多差一倍。硅谷码农一年到手收入20-40万$,虽然当地不算最顶尖,但放眼全球范围内,都是顶尖的,他们对于商品的购买力非常强。
但如果某种商品不能通过集装箱运输,比如教育,医疗,房子,法律,那么你在购买的时候,你只是在和当地属地内的人在竞争,这样的价格在不同地区相差就会非常大,比如在美国看病的价格可能是中国的10倍甚至100倍,此时,你的购买力基本就取决于你的收入在本地的排名。
年收入20-40万,在全球是很不错的收入,但在硅谷,尤其比较富裕的社区,只能说是中下水平,甚至entry level,不是很有竞争力。所以。此时,如果你坚持购买最好的服务,就会出现入不敷出的情况。而且如果你购买的服务,还都和人相关的话,那在美国会不忍直视。
而在如今,中美两边的中产及以上的家庭/个人,80%以上的支出都是购买服务,比如说买房、看病、医疗,出去下馆子。
所以对于中国人来说,无论你赚多少,当换算成美元的时候,就会显得苍白;对于在美生活的人来说,无论美元的购买力多么强,美国的牛羊肉多么便宜,就算它的价格降为0,最后只能省下20%的开支。
不过,货币的绝对价值高还是有好处的,因为作为消费者,你可以选择错位竞争。
在美国的牛马虽然挣得还行但过得不富裕,但只要出国,回国,不管探亲还是旅游,体验分分钟起飞,可以全程五星级酒店,因为北京/上海的五星级,每晚的房间费比硅谷很多房子每天的房产税还要低。
中美之间的生活成本差距就是这么大。
美国不是完美的,中国也不是一无是处。如果你问我,我会告诉你:美国相对来说,还是机会多一些,努力工作就会有好的回报,这一点会比中国好很多。然后不涉及人的物价便宜,涉及人的方面中国体验碾压美国,然后美国生活压力小于中国。
02 从商学院招生看创业选择和品牌建设
最近除了毕业季,还正是美国的商学院发Offer的时候。几家欢喜几家愁。
有人拿到了不止一家的offer,在纠结去哪,也有人今年要接受全聚(拒)德的悲催。没有人喜欢被别人拒,商学院也不例外,所以学校之间,和申请者一样都是竞(合)争关系。
美国的商学院大概可以分为3档。HSW"黑丝袜",M7和S16。黑丝袜其实是中国人对Harvard, Stanford, Wharton 的戏称。
(图:原文此处有配图——HSW/M7 商学院校徽)
M7,有人说是Magic 7 Top Business School,也有人说是Magnificent 7,哪个是正宗的全称,无从考证。关于M7的由来,江湖谣言是这7个商学院从院长到招生官、从就业指导老师到Marketing员工,每两年会聚会一次,指点江山、讨论行业走势,有点像"行业协会"的性质。这感觉就像是江湖中自发组织的英雄联盟,这七位大佬意气相投,互相欣赏,外人想加入都不行。
S16全称是Sweet 16,据说是利用美国大学篮球所讲的十六强来命名,在美国似乎没有听到这种个说法,但这个排名就是在M7的基础上加上以下九所。
(图:原文此处有配图——HSW/M7/S16 商学院分档图)
今天主要想聊聊3所商学院:Stanford GSB, Harvard HBS,Northwestern Kellogg,
斯坦福是一个极其特别的存在。硅谷的迅速崛起,为斯坦福带来的直接回报除了迅速上升的reputation和金钱,还有一种无形的回报更为重要:源源不断的智力资源和生气勃勃的活力。
凭借硅谷的技术开发优势,斯坦福有了一笔收入不菲的专利转让费。从1954年到1976年,斯坦福的专利转让费在45000美元左右。然而,从1970年技术授权办公室创办到1998年,专利转让收入达三亿美元。由斯坦福分娩的公司每年的收入达到一千亿美元。1991年,斯坦福百年校庆的募捐达126亿美元的天文数字,这是高等教育史上的最高纪录,当时的哈佛也望尘莫及。
过去50年中,硅谷由斯坦福教授、学生和毕业生创办的公司高达1200多家,目前近1半的硅谷产品来自斯坦福校友关联公司。算上惠普,1988年到1996年由斯坦福人的企业创造的收入占硅谷总收入的60%。
不光学生爱创业,斯坦福对教授开公司都非常支持。教授在完成基本教学任务和发论文外,斯坦福并不会干涉教授到外面公司兼职。甚至让他们离开学校创办公司或者在公司里担任要职。第十任斯坦福大学校长和Alphabet董事会主席轩尼诗(John L. Hennessy)是一个鲜明的例子。而马克·安德森称他为"硅谷教父"
80年代,轩尼诗发明了RISC指令集的处理器 MIPS 后,与人合伙创办了MIPS公司。此后几年内,他主要在公司上班,而不是在学校教学和研究。几年后,MIPS公司上市,公司卖给它的客户SGI(Silicon Graphic Inc)。轩尼诗从工业界回到斯坦福担任工学院院长。再到后来担任斯坦福校长。
轩尼诗认为,企业家精神是大学的一部分。他鼓励教授和企业联合。斯坦福师生有一个信念,他们认为他们的创新会让世界更美好。斯坦福教授们从特曼开始就有投资自己学生的传统。到了轩尼诗这里成了师生共同创业的传统。斯坦福的专利办公室把超过八千项学校的专利授权给了企业,并收取13亿美元的专利费。
(图:原文此处有配图——Silicon Valley 企业地图)
斯坦福偏爱"有创业精神的年轻人",而且在你读书期间,就不断地给大家"洗脑",鼓励创业,结果就是,毕业生有40%都不找工作直接创业,加上毕业几年内离职创业的人,最后估计绝大部分都去创业了。
创业成功是小概率事件,斯坦福的也不例外。但一旦成功了就会变得很有钱,就可以给学校捐款了!创业失败的那些人呢?没关系,反正也不指望他们捐款——如果他们不创业而去打工,也发不了大财,没钱可捐。
对于学校而言,最重要的不是让大部分人能过"小康生活",而是能"发财"的人足够多!时间长了,斯坦福也形成了良性循环——很多校友捐款,"按需分配"的奖学金很多,学生还贷压力很小,更多人毕业以后去创业,发了财就回来捐款。所以,斯坦福是在拿做VC的模式做教学。
哈佛是第二个很有意思的例子。它特别喜欢招"天不怕地不怕的年轻人",案例教学法是主要教学方法,考试分数里面大部分是"课堂发言",拼命鼓励大家举手发言。结果常常是拼谁举手举得快。许多人连案例也没看明白,甚至问题都没有听清楚,就举手了;有时候就是站起来一顿乱说,说了才有分数,没说就没分数。一到提问题环节,举手快的人,把90%的"air time"都给占了,可以想象,这些人在之后毕业进入大企业工作,也更容易受到注意,获得更多的证明能力的机会(当然也是更多犯错误的机会)。
大企业的"corporate ladder"是很长很长的,能够爬到金字塔顶端的人常常都是在年轻的时候就有高层的领导欣赏,然后坐"直升飞机",所谓跟对人比做对事重要100倍,1000倍。哈佛的人在这样的环境中可能会两极分化,拍胸脯抢项目,做砸了就是丢掉饭碗,但做成了就有机会快速升迁。downside 和upside不完全不一样。在商学院里面,哈佛是最擅长培养大企业的高层领导的。据不完全统计,世界500强的CEO里面,哈佛商学院数量达到33个,比后面几名的加起来还多。
Kellogg这家低调的学校也许很多中国人不太知道,但是美国人听了都会竖一根大拇指。Kellogg在上世纪70年代还是名不见经传的商学院,在80年代突然异军突起,在接下来30年间,有近1/3的时间都雄踞美国商学院排行榜第一名。
为什么呢?原来70年代末,Kellogg新上任的院长Jacobs他发现一个秘密,并对此进行了一项小改革:当时商学院招收学生主要依靠GPA、标化(GMAT/GRE),简历和申请文书。Jacobs发现很多申请材料特别出众的学生,在找工作的时候找得并不好,而与此同时,许多工作找得好的学生,申请材料却很平平。
原来来招聘的企业,除了看学生的成绩和简历,更重要的是面试,而很多人会考试,会写文章,但并不怎么会面试。于是,他把"面试"作为招生的重要环节。执行的结果就是,经过面试筛选过的这一届学生,就业率直接提升一大截。
美国的杂志和商学院本身,都喜欢比较商学院的就业率,工资,去向。结果发现Kellogg异军突起傲视群雄。不仅如此,Kellogg还每年公布一个"就业报告",把所有毕业生的姓名、去向都写在里面,(这好像开了先河直到今天),还能看到不同行业的平均工资,奖金。慢慢地越来越多的优秀的申请人都会申请Kellogg而且优先选择它。而用人单位发现来Kellogg能招到"好用"的人,就会扩大在Kellogg招人,这些毕业生过几年又回到母校来招人,给母校捐款。优秀的学生多了,许多优秀的教授也愿意到Kellogg来教书。良性循环至此建立完毕。
说到商学院,是觉得很多东西可以举一反三,触类旁通。
艾伦·列维说:"你的工作是了解问题,再为他们提供最佳解决产品。"于是,有人能做到"不是用户要什么就给什么",原因在于关注焦点并不在于问题本身,而是想尽一切办法找到那需求的根源——关注焦点在于更本质的、更深层次的原因,而后给出最好、最简洁的解决方式/产品。
创业者们其实可以借鉴斯坦福,Kellogg的崛起经验。
- 首先,要充分认清你的用户到底是谁,以及用户他们的核心需求是什么。MBA申请人这个"产品"的核心用户是来学校招聘的企业,而"MBA教育"这个"产品"的核心用户是商学院的申请人。所以,只有满足好了招聘企业的核心需求(招人),才能满足好申请人的需求(找到好工作)。
而你对用户的选择,常常会决定你的产品形态,产品形态又影响用户行为。这种"一致性",常常是让竞争对手(哪怕是比你大许多的家伙)没办法抄袭的重要原因。
竞争大部分时候存在,但有时也会"失效"。如果一个人极其强,那么对他来说,竞争与合作都是实际上不存在的,比如,爱因斯坦,他也想跟别人合作,可谁配与他合作呢?其他人倒是也想跟他竞争,可又有谁能竞争过他呢?
做一个特立独行的人并不难,难的是,正确地特立独行。多跟聪明人讨论,多和比你年长3-5岁的聪明人交往,然后深入思考他们不认同的地方。在笨蛋中特立独行是没有价值的。
在很多领域,先发优势是很明显的。在这种领域创业,就要像哈佛商学院的学生一样,快速获得投资人的关注,融钱以后迅速跑,然后再融钱,再继续跑。拼多多崛起时,开个店铺不要太简单,且免费,简单到传统商家进去看一眼,觉得"这什么破玩意",并不屑于自己去开个店。
终究有一天,大家才明白原来这么赚钱!然后更多的"职业商家"冲进去想要分一杯羹,但门槛已经太高了——虽然本身依然免费开店,但后来者的商品排名靠后,转化率跟不上,就只好砸钱。然后发现开个网店并不比开个地面店容易,虽然没有"房租",但其他成本更高。
因为他们在纳税——落后税。
03 买时间的人
如果说童年的经历会极大影响一个人的性格,那么二十多岁是重建自我的最佳时期。刚刚走出象牙塔,你的世界观与价值观还未完全定型,开始从物质与精神上独立于父母,追寻属于自己的人生。
这个阶段读过的书,见过的人,经历的事,都会极大影响你的精神气质。而你在当下做出的一切选择都是有成本的;愈往后,改变所需要考虑的因素愈多,阻力与难度也愈大。
这时候,一定要舍得投资自己,看似花了不少钱,但从整个人生的长度来看,这其实是最低成本的投资——建立强大意志,掌握科学有效的方法,去搭建自己想要的人生。获得的收益之高,根本无法用金钱来评估。
如果说产品经理的一切目标就是"解决痛点",其实,我个人更欣赏大卫·海涅迈尔·汉森的描述——痒(the itch)——非得挠挠才舒服痛快。
真正好的产品,确实会提供一个很好的体验,而这种体验,过去没有,现在有了,一旦开始用了,就无法想象没有它怎么办。
大到比如现在的大模型,当初的搜索引擎、手机里的导航软件,小的比如已经在电脑上习以为常的"复制、粘贴"——猜猜有多少PC用户换到Mac系统上之后发现没有"剪切"之后有多么烦躁?
创业者都想找到痛点。如何找到痛点?不考虑运气的话,那么靠谱答案就只有一个:积累——通过在那个领域里的长期沉淀与积累,知道什么是最重要的问题,知道什么是必要条件,知道自己需要哪些技能才能实现,还有哪些不足需要去弥补。
很早很早开始积累就可以了吗?也不见得,时间虽然是很大的度量衡,但还有一个必要条件:方向。
近几年你可能会看到,那些5年或10年前看上去那么遥不可及的东西,突然就实实在在地出现在你面前。
如果一个创业者没有积淀,就没有能力思考未来。那么他也就没有了方向,于是,积累也不见得最终真的有用。
如果说有远见的创业者是少数的话,那么有远见的投资者永远是极少数。但反过来正因如此,这些极少数有极强远见的投资者,相互之间的联系更为紧密,乃至惺惺相惜,也因此他们掌握的资源要多出无数倍,因为极端与集中永远是普适效应。
如果说有哪些事情,适合思考未来,我想应该是:
a. 开启心智——多看杂书,多多益善。杂书会大大提高一个人的接受新事物的能力(理解能力的一种)。阅历丰富、大概率会有更强的理解力,在遇到未知的时,更有可能迅速地在自己已有的知识中找到可以用来类比的对象从而建立认知和判断。
b. 广结善缘,所谓在家靠父母,出门靠朋友
c. 建立人生观的审美: 你想过怎样的人生
Introduction
We're in the middle of graduation season worldwide. Not long ago I was catching up with a friend who works at one of the big Silicon Valley tech companies — we got to talking about AI, about life inside the giants, about work in general. In 2025, the job market on both sides of the Pacific is not good. You could even call it dismal.
Structural unemployment hasn't budged, and on top of it, frictional, cyclical, and technological unemployment have all spiked noticeably, driven by AI and by the macro picture.
What follows is my own experience over the past year, layered on top of feedback I've gathered along the way. These are personal opinions only, aimed at no particular company or person. Discussion and debate are welcome.
Here goes — enjoy.
01 The world, at bottom, is one giant pay-to-rank auction
If you drew a chart and looked for a dividing line, 2018 — or 2020 — would be the obvious marker. For careers on both the Chinese and American sides, both years are clear inflection points. The pandemic changed a lot. Arguably, it changed everything.
2018 fell during the first round of the trade war in Trump's first term; 2025 marks the opening of the trade war in his second.
Before 2018, among Chinese students who came to the U.S. to study, the ratio of "go home" to "stay in America" was roughly 70/30 or 80/20. Today it's completely flipped: stay-versus-return is now 70/30, or even 80/20.
Take a sample from my own circle. A friend finished a Princeton computer science PhD in 2014, then spent five years working in Silicon Valley; his wife is also at an internet company. In the local slang, they're a "Silicon Valley dual-coder" household.
- Housing: In 2014 they bought a house in the Bay Area — a $1.2 million place (prices have probably nearly doubled since), 2,000 sq ft (about 185 square meters), 4 bed, 3 bath, in a good school district. They took a $600K mortgage, paying $3,500 a month; property tax is 1.12%, another $1,100 a month. Safe neighborhood. The kind of place where nobody bothers to lock the door at night.
- Food: Both eat breakfast and lunch at the office; dinner they cook at home. The company serves dinner too, but the ever-striving Chinese stomach still prefers home cooking. On weekends they eat out two or three times. About $2,000 a month.
- Leisure: Two trips abroad a year, plus one trip back to China. About $10,000 a year.
- Transport: Two cars; insurance, maintenance, and gas run $5,000 a year.
- Work: In by 11, out by 7, with plenty of discretionary time. He gets along well with colleagues, has switched jobs once, is now a staff engineer at a big company, and is looking to move onto the management track.
- Income: He makes $500K+, his wife $300K. After maxing out their 401(k)s, and counting that contribution, their after-tax income is around $500K, against $110K in spending — so they save roughly $390K a year.
Compare that to a classmate of his back in China — another top student, and a close friend. He joined Tencent in 2010, before mobile internet had even taken off. He's now a small-team lead in some vertical, at level T3, earning 1.3 million-plus RMB, around 800K after tax. Household after-tax income is about 900K. The 996 grind is the norm and the pressure is intense. His net worth today — stocks and cash — is two to three times his American friend's.
That friend joined a startup in 2019. It went public in the first half of 2021, and the stock rose eightfold.
That, roughly, is the American workplace and cost of living before 2020.
And after 2020? Education (tuition), healthcare, and housing became the three great mountains of the new era.
At Safeway, California's most ordinary supermarket: Häagen-Dazs is $7 a pint; whole-wheat bread $4 a loaf; a bunch of fresh roses (a dozen) $14.99, so about $1 a stem; apples $3 a pound; a head of cabbage $3.69; milk $3.80 (2.5 liters); corn $0.70 an ear; bananas $1 a pound (at Trader Joe's, $0.23–$0.29 each); laundry detergent about $18 for 2.5 liters.
The prices of daily necessities — eggs, bottled water, milk — have doubled in five years. Restaurant tips start at 18%, and even the self-service ordering kiosks now pop up a screen asking you to tip.
I have a friend in Silicon Valley, around my age, who graduated and landed at a big company — a perfectly respectable start, $200K–$250K on entry. He doesn't spend recklessly, but when he tallies things up at month's end, money is still tight. Some months he even has to sell stock to clear his bills.
(Figure in original.)
The reason behind all this is: the world, at bottom, is one giant pay-to-rank auction.
Your income — and the standard of living it buys you — comes down to two things. First, where your income ranks locally: in Beijing or Shanghai, in the Bay Area or New York. Second, where your income ranks nationally, even globally.
Your global ranking is essentially your maximum purchasing power over goods. If a good can be packed into a shipping container and moved to another country, across an ocean, by one mode of transport or another, then it is essentially being bid on by the whole world at once. China can buy cherries grown in Chile; America can buy iPhones made in China. There's logistics and there are tariffs, but the final price of a good in different countries differs by at most a factor of two. A Silicon Valley coder taking home $200K–$400K a year may not be top-tier locally, but on a global scale is at the very top, with enormous purchasing power over goods.
But if a good can't be shipped in a container — education, healthcare, housing, legal services — then when you buy it, you're only competing with people inside your own locality. Prices then vary wildly by region. Seeing a doctor in the U.S. might cost 10 or even 100 times what it does in China. In that case your purchasing power comes down almost entirely to where your income ranks locally.
An income of $200K–$400K is a very good income globally, but in Silicon Valley — especially in the wealthier neighborhoods — it's only lower-middle, entry-level even, not very competitive. So if you insist on buying the best of everything, you'll end up spending more than you make. And if the services you're buying are labor-intensive, the prices in America become almost too painful to look at.
These days, for middle-class-and-above households and individuals on both sides of the Pacific, over 80% of spending goes to buying services — housing, medical care, healthcare, eating out.
So for Chinese people: no matter how much you earn, the moment you convert it to dollars it looks pale. And for people living in America: no matter how strong the dollar's purchasing power is, no matter how cheap American beef and lamb are — even if the price dropped to zero, you'd only shave 20% off your spending.
Still, there is an upside to holding a currency of high absolute value: as a consumer, you can compete asymmetrically.
The working stiff in America earns decently but doesn't live rich. But the moment you go abroad — back home to visit family, or just traveling — the experience takes off instantly. You can stay in five-star hotels the whole way, because a night in a Beijing or Shanghai five-star costs less than the daily property tax on plenty of Silicon Valley houses.
That's how large the cost-of-living gap between China and the U.S. really is.
America isn't perfect, and China isn't worthless. If you asked me, I'd tell you: on balance, America still offers more opportunity, and hard work is more reliably rewarded — that's a lot better than in China. Anything not involving people is cheap; anything involving people, China's experience crushes America's; and life in America carries less pressure than life in China.
02 What business school admissions teach us about startups and brand-building
Beyond graduation season, it's also the time of year when American business schools send out their offers. Some rejoice, some despair.
Some people are holding more than one offer, agonizing over where to go; others are on the receiving end of the dreaded clean sweep of rejections. Nobody enjoys being rejected, and business schools are no exception — which is why the schools, just like the applicants, are locked in a relationship that is equal parts competition and cooperation.
American business schools break roughly into three tiers: HSW, M7, and S16. HSW is Chinese students' playful shorthand for Harvard, Stanford, and Wharton.
(Figure in original.)
M7 — some say it stands for "Magic 7 Top Business Schools," others for "Magnificent 7"; which is the authentic full name, nobody can say. As for the origin of M7, the going legend is that these seven schools — from deans to admissions officers, from career counselors to marketing staff — gather once every two years to hold court and debate industry trends, something like a trade association. It's as if seven kingpins of the martial-arts world, kindred spirits who admire one another, formed a private league that outsiders simply aren't allowed to join.
S16 stands for "Sweet 16," supposedly named after the round of sixteen in American college basketball — though I've never actually heard anyone in the U.S. use the term. The ranking is simply M7 plus the following nine schools.
(Figure in original.)
Today I mainly want to talk about three of them: Stanford GSB, Harvard HBS, and Northwestern Kellogg.
Stanford is a truly singular case. Silicon Valley's rapid rise gave Stanford not only a fast-climbing reputation and a great deal of money, but something less tangible and more important: an endless supply of intellectual talent and vibrant energy.
Riding on Silicon Valley's technology-development edge, Stanford earned handsome patent-licensing revenue. From 1954 to 1976, that revenue hovered around $45,000. But from the founding of its technology-licensing office in 1970 through 1998, licensing income reached $300 million. Companies born of Stanford generate $100 billion in revenue a year. In 1991, Stanford's centennial fundraising drive brought in an astronomical $12.6 billion — the highest figure in the history of higher education, one that even Harvard of the day couldn't come close to.
Over the past 50 years, more than 1,200 companies in Silicon Valley have been founded by Stanford professors, students, and graduates; today nearly half of Silicon Valley's products come from companies tied to Stanford alumni. Counting HP, from 1988 to 1996 the revenue created by Stanford people's companies made up 60% of Silicon Valley's total.
It's not just the students who love to start companies — Stanford is enormously supportive of professors doing it too. As long as they fulfill their basic teaching and publishing duties, Stanford doesn't interfere with professors moonlighting at outside companies. It even lets them leave to found companies or take senior roles at them. Stanford's tenth president, and Alphabet's board chairman, John L. Hennessy is a vivid example — Marc Andreessen called him "the godfather of Silicon Valley."
In the 1980s, after inventing the RISC-based MIPS processor, Hennessy co-founded MIPS. For the next few years he mostly worked at the company rather than teaching or researching at the university. A few years later MIPS went public and was sold to its customer SGI (Silicon Graphics Inc.). Hennessy returned from industry to Stanford as dean of the engineering school — and later became the university's president.
Hennessy believed that entrepreneurship is part of the university. He encouraged professors to partner with businesses. Stanford's faculty and students share a conviction: that their innovations will make the world better. Ever since Frederick Terman, Stanford professors have had a tradition of investing in their own students; by Hennessy's time this had become a tradition of professors and students founding companies together. Stanford's patent office has licensed over 8,000 school patents to businesses, collecting $1.3 billion in patent fees.
(Figure in original.)
Stanford favors "young people with entrepreneurial spirit," and throughout your time there it relentlessly "brainwashes" you, pushing you to start something. The result: 40% of graduates skip the job hunt and go straight into starting a company, and once you add those who quit to found something within a few years of graduating, the vast majority probably end up as founders.
Startups succeed only rarely, and Stanford's are no exception. But those that do succeed get very rich — and then they can donate to the school! And the ones who fail? No matter — nobody was counting on their donations anyway. Had they taken jobs instead of founding companies, they wouldn't have struck it rich either, and would have had no money to give.
For a school, the point isn't getting most people to a comfortable middle-class life — it's producing enough people who get rich. Over time, Stanford built a virtuous cycle: plenty of alumni donations, plenty of need-based scholarships, students carry little loan burden, more of them go on to start companies after graduating, and when they strike it rich they come back and give. So Stanford runs its education like a VC firm.
Harvard is a second fascinating example. It especially loves recruiting "young people who fear nothing." The case method is its main pedagogy, and a big chunk of your grade comes from "class participation" — so everyone is furiously encouraged to raise their hand and speak. The result is often a contest of who can shoot their hand up fastest. Plenty of people haven't even understood the case, haven't even heard the question clearly, and yet up goes the hand; sometimes you just stand up and ramble, because saying something earns points and saying nothing earns none. Come the Q&A, the fast hands hog 90% of the air time. You can imagine that once these people graduate into big corporations, they too more easily get noticed and get more chances to prove themselves (and, of course, more chances to make mistakes).
The corporate ladder at big companies is very, very long. The people who reach the top are often the ones who, while still young, caught the eye of a senior leader and rode the "elevator" up — proof that following the right person matters a hundred, a thousand times more than doing the right thing. In such an environment, Harvard people can polarize: beat your chest and grab the project, and if you blow it you lose your job — but if you pull it off, you get a shot at rapid promotion. The downside and the upside are entirely asymmetric. Among the business schools, Harvard is the best at producing senior leaders for large corporations. By one rough count, Harvard Business School accounts for 33 of the CEOs of the Fortune Global 500 — more than the next several schools combined.
Kellogg is a low-key school that many Chinese may not know well, but say the name to an American and you'll get a thumbs-up. As recently as the 1970s Kellogg was an obscure business school; in the 1980s it suddenly burst onto the scene, and over the following 30 years it held the number-one spot in American business-school rankings for nearly a third of that time.
Why? Back in the late 1970s, Kellogg's newly appointed dean, Jacobs, discovered a secret and made a small reform around it. At the time, business schools admitted students mainly on GPA, standardized tests (GMAT/GRE), résumés, and application essays. Jacobs noticed that many students with outstanding application materials didn't do well in the job search, while many who landed great jobs had rather mediocre applications.
It turned out that the companies doing the recruiting cared, beyond grades and résumés, most of all about the interview — and many people who could ace tests and write essays weren't much good at interviewing. So Jacobs made the interview a key part of admissions. The upshot: the cohort screened through interviews saw its employment rate jump sharply.
American magazines and the business schools themselves love to compare employment rates, salaries, and placements. And there it was — Kellogg surging past the pack. Not only that, Kellogg began publishing an annual "employment report" listing every graduate's name and destination (which seems to have set a precedent that endures to this day), along with average salaries and bonuses by industry. Gradually, more and more strong applicants applied to Kellogg and made it their first choice. And employers, finding they could hire "useful" people out of Kellogg, expanded their recruiting there; those graduates, a few years on, would return to their alma mater to recruit and to donate. With more strong students, many strong professors also became willing to teach there. The virtuous cycle was complete.
Speaking of business schools, I find much of this transfers by analogy across domains.
Alan Levy said: "Your job is to understand the problem, then offer them the best product to solve it." So some people manage not to "just give the user whatever they ask for" — because the focus isn't the problem itself, but doing everything possible to find the root of the need; the focus is on the more essential, deeper cause, and then delivering the best, simplest solution or product.
Founders can learn from how Stanford and Kellogg rose.
- First, you must clearly understand who your users really are, and what their core need is. The core users of the "product" that is the MBA applicant are the companies coming to campus to recruit; the core users of the "product" that is MBA education are the business school's applicants. So only by satisfying the recruiters' core need (hiring good people) can you satisfy the applicants' need (landing a good job).
And your choice of user often determines the shape of your product, which in turn shapes user behavior. That kind of "coherence" is often precisely why competitors — even ones much bigger than you — can't copy you.
Competition exists most of the time, but sometimes it "breaks down." For someone truly exceptional, both competition and cooperation effectively cease to exist. Take Einstein: he too wanted to collaborate with others, but who was worthy of collaborating with him? Others may have wanted to compete with him, but who could out-compete him?
It's not hard to be a maverick; the hard part is being a maverick correctly. Talk more with smart people, spend time with smart people three to five years older than you, and then think hard about the places where they disagree with you. Being a maverick among fools is worthless.
In many fields the first-mover advantage is pronounced. To start a company in such a field, you have to be like the Harvard Business School student — quickly grab investors' attention, raise money, then sprint, then raise more and keep sprinting. When Pinduoduo rose, opening a shop couldn't have been easier, and it was free — so simple that traditional merchants would take one look and think, "what junk is this," and not deign to open a store.
Eventually everyone realized just how profitable it was. Then more "professional merchants" rushed in to grab a slice, but by then the barrier was already too high — opening a store was still free, but the newcomers' products ranked lower, their conversion rates couldn't keep up, and so they had to spend to buy their way up. And then they discovered that running an online shop was no easier than running a physical one: no "rent," sure, but the other costs were higher.
Because they were paying a tax — the latecomer's tax.
03 The people who buy time
If childhood experience shapes a person's character profoundly, then your twenties are the prime time to rebuild the self. Fresh out of the ivory tower, your worldview and values not yet fully set, you begin to gain independence from your parents — materially and spiritually — and to chase a life of your own.
The books you read, the people you meet, and the things you experience in this phase will profoundly shape your inner character. And every choice you make in the present carries a cost; the further along you go, the more factors any change must reckon with, and the greater the resistance and difficulty.
At this stage, you must be willing to invest in yourself. It looks like a lot of money spent, but across the full length of a life it is actually the lowest-cost investment there is — building a strong will, mastering scientific and effective methods, and constructing the life you want. The returns are so high they simply can't be measured in money.
If the whole aim of a product manager is to "solve a pain point," I personally prefer David Heinemeier Hansson's framing — the itch — the kind you just have to scratch before you feel right.
A truly good product does deliver a great experience — one that didn't exist before but exists now, and once you start using it, you can't imagine going without it.
Big things, like today's large models, or the search engines and phone navigation apps of an earlier day; small things, like "copy and paste," which you now take for granted on a computer — guess how maddening it is for PC users switching to a Mac to discover there's no "cut"?
Every founder wants to find a pain point. How do you find one? Setting luck aside, the only reliable answer is: accumulation — through long immersion and buildup in a field, you come to know what the most important problem is, what the necessary conditions are, which skills you'll need to pull it off, and what gaps you still have to close.
Is it enough just to start accumulating very, very early? Not necessarily. Time is a great measuring stick, but there's another necessary condition: direction.
In recent years you may have noticed that things which looked utterly out of reach five or ten years ago suddenly, concretely, appear right in front of you.
If a founder has no accumulated depth, they have no ability to think about the future. And then they have no direction — and so the accumulation may not, in the end, prove useful at all.
If visionary founders are few, visionary investors are always fewer still. But precisely for that reason, these very few investors with the strongest foresight are more tightly connected to one another, even to the point of mutual kinship — and so they command orders of magnitude more resources, because the extreme and the concentrated is a universal effect.
If there are things worth doing to think about the future, I'd say they are:
a. Open up the mind — read widely and eclectically, the more the better. Miscellaneous reading greatly increases a person's capacity to take in new things (a form of comprehension). The richer your experience, the stronger your understanding is likely to be, and the more likely that, faced with the unknown, you can quickly find something in your existing knowledge to draw an analogy to, and so build a judgment.
b. Cast a wide net of goodwill — as the saying goes, at home you rely on your parents; out in the world, on your friends.
c. Build an aesthetic for your own life: what kind of life do you want to live?